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ABSTRACT
Policy to reduce the European Union’s (EU) carbon footprint needs to be grounded in
an understanding of the structure and drivers of both the domestic and internationally
traded components. Here we analyse consumption-based emission accounts (for the
main greenhouse gases (GHGs)) for the EU, focusing on understanding sectoral
contributions and what changes have been observed over the last two decades,
including the role of trade. The EU28 has reduced its overall GHG footprint by 8%
over the two decades, mainly due to the use of more eﬃcient technology, both at
home and abroad. Emissions embodied in imports, which make up one-third of the
EU28 GHG footprint, grew strongly until 2008 but have stabilized in volume since.
Foreign production has been more emissions intensive than if goods were
produced in the EU. However, the overall contribution of this eﬀect is small, oﬀset
by much larger (global) technological improvements and growths in consumption.
Hence the focus should now be on accounting and responsibility for enacting
change, not the global impact of trade. Finally, the inclusion of non-CO2 GHGs in
the analysis shows their importance in the traded element, particularly for the
mining and agricultural sectors.
Key policy insights
. The total EU carbon footprint has reduced since 2007, but at a slower rate than
production-based emissions, and rarely faster than GDP growth.
. Consumption growth has had a much greater impact on the EU carbon footprint
than the oﬀshoring of production.
. Trade in both directions (imports and exports) is important for the manufacturing
sector. The data does not support claims of wholesale ‘de-industrialisation’ but
rather reﬂects increased trade intensity related to specialization.
. Several (but not all) of the major sources of net embodied imports are largely
unavoidable consequences of European consumption because the primary
production activities (e.g. mining and signiﬁcant shares of agricultural) could not
realistically occur within the EU.
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1. Introduction
Consumption-based carbon accounting (CBCA) of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has been suggested as a
complement to traditional territorial emissions inventories in order to capture the global impact on the
climate of the aﬄuent lifestyles of highly developed countries (Kokoni & Skea, 2014; Peters & Hertwich, 2008;
Steininger, Lininger, Meyer, Muñoz, & Schinko, 2015). One focus of CBCA is the social justice argument about
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aiming for long-term equality in per-capita carbon emission allowances (Chakravarty et al., 2009), which makes
more sense if calculated from a consumption viewpoint. A second focus of CBCA is to address the concern that
domestic emissions reductions in many highly developed countries may have only occurred due to a shift of
consumption patterns towards products that are largely imported (e.g. IT) or due to a shift of production
towards foreign sites with better resource access (e.g. steel, aluminum) and/or weaker emission mitigation strat-
egies. That is, CBCA seeks to capture the issue of relocation in addition to reduction of emissions (Droege, 2011).
The displacement of emissions has been an increasing concern since the early 1990s, as the share of industrial
activities in GDP of many of the OECD countries declined, and the Asian economies emerged (Peters, Minx,
Weber, & Edenhofer, 2011).
With the continued growth of global trade, the de-industrialization trend in Europe, deeper domestic decar-
bonization, and the rise of more complex supply chains, the fraction of a developed country’s greenhouse gas
(GHG) footprint that occurs abroad will likely continue to rise for the foreseeable future (Wood, Grubb, et al.,
2019). Tracking and measuring emissions embodied in trade with Europe will be crucial if the region is to
make more meaningful contributions to reducing global GHG emissions. However, the policy situation
becomes more complex when CBCA is applied; there are many actors along (international) supply-chains
that could potentially enact change to reduce emissions (Hertwich & Wood, 2018), and administrative, jurisdic-
tional and competitiveness issues become paramount.
A number of models and papers provide aggregate production and consumption accounts for EU countries
and regions (Hertwich & Peters, 2009; Ivanova et al., 2015, 2017; Pan et al., 2017; Peters, Davis, & Andrew, 2012;
Steen-Olsen, Weinzettel, Cranston, Ercin, & Hertwich, 2012; Wood et al., 2018). Data portals also exist, such as the
Global Carbon Project (Le Quéré et al., 2018), the https://environmentalfootprints.org website (Stadler, Lonka,
Moran, Pallas, & Wood, 2015), and the avoided emissions calculation of Eurostat (dataset: env_ac_io10).
These results point to the EU being a net-importer of carbon, that is, they have a larger CBCA than emissions
produced in the EU. The results reported by Eurostat are the only exception, this being a modelling artefact
of assuming domestic technology used in imports.1 However, limited detailed and speciﬁc analysis was under-
taken for the EU until the parallel work of Karstensen, Peters, and Andrew (2018). These authors ﬁnd a peaking of
emissions for CBCA in 2006, against a steady backdrop of declining territorial emissions, principally due to the
decline in emissions of manufacturing goods in imports and from domestic electricity and gas.
Here we focus on the structure and drivers of the CBCA of EU emissions over the last 20 years (1995–2016) and
include all major GHGs. The main objective of the article is to provide an empirical basis for the subsequent
design of policy that is explored within this special supplement (Grubb, Crawford–Brown, Neuhoﬀ, & Shanes,
2019; Moran et al., 2018; Pollitt & Neuhoﬀ, 2019). We focus on the trends in emissions, including the diﬀerent
perspective that CBCA gives to traditional measures, the role of trade and consumption in driving changes in
the CBCA of the EU, and what sectors and product groups are responsible for the highest volume of emissions
embodied in trade and consumption. The work goes beyond Karstensen et al. (2018) in several ways. We focus
on the structure of emissions across production and consumption perspectives simultaneously to understand
which sectors, sources and gases policy would need to inﬂuence. We include a full calculation of all major
GHGs (not just CO2); employ a full multi-regional input-output model of all results, rather than the trade adjust-
ment method of Peters, Davis, et al. (2012) for the temporal trends; provide a deeper analysis of drivers through
structural decomposition analysis; and ﬁnally go into much deeper sector and product detail.
The remainder of the article includes a brief description of methods with more detail in the appendix, before
the presentation of a range of results showing the CBCA of the EU28 from various perspectives. A short discus-
sion speciﬁcally on the sectoral structure of the CBCA and the implications for policy sovereignty follows, in
order to set up the reader for further policy analysis of accompanying papers in this special supplement.
2. Methods
2.1. Production-based and consumption-based carbon accounts
Almost all international level studies on consumption-based GHG accounts use multi-regional input-output
(MRIO) analysis. Wiedmann and Lenzen (2018) provide an overview of recent applications, whilst Peters, Davis,
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et al. (2012) present perhaps the most comprehensive investigation into MRIO approaches. The appendix pro-
vides a short mathematical introduction to MRIO analysis, and for further information the reader is referred to
textbooks such as Miller and Blair (2009), reference articles such as Minx et al. (2009) or speciﬁc method descrip-
tions such as Wood (2017).
Here, we use the terms: ‘production-based’ carbon accounting (PBCA), which refers to the GHG emis-
sions produced by (industrial, government and private) residents of the European Union (EU28) (and
diﬀers in terms of handling international transport and purchases by residents abroad to ‘territorial
accounts’ – see Usubiaga & Acosta-Fernández, 2015); and ‘consumption-based’ carbon accounting
(CBCA), which refers to the GHG emissions allocated to the region where goods and services are ﬁnally
consumed, and includes both private household, collective and government consumption, as well as
capital formation. Emissions embodied in imports reﬂect those emissions that are released outside the
EU28 in the supply-chain of the goods and services that go to ﬁnal demand in the EU28. Similarly, emis-
sions embodied in exports are the emissions released in the EU28 embodied in goods and services that go
to ﬁnal demand in countries outside the EU28. Note, to avoid double counting, emissions are allocated
only to producers (PBCA) or ﬁnal demand (CBCA), and not to intermediate producers (e.g. in the pro-
duction of car parts before assembly into a car). The appendix provides a mathematical description of
this allocation.
Results are also presented for the rate of decoupling and for the drivers of changes in emissions over time.
For the calculation of the decoupling factor, the PBCA and CBCA of emissions are normalized by GDP in 2011
international dollars of the respective year, before the rate of change is calculated. For the calculation of the
drivers of changes in emissions, the annual MRIO tables were deﬂated to previous year prices, in which we per-
formed a structural decomposition analysis. See appendix for the description of these calculations and a range
of literature for an introduction to this analytical technique (Arto & Dietzenbacher, 2014; Hoekstra, Michel, & Suh,
2016; Hoekstra & van den Bergh, 2002).
2.2. Data source
There are a number of MRIO databases available including EXIOBASE (Tukker, de Koning, Wood, Hawkins,
et al., 2013; Wood et al., 2015), WIOD (Dietzenbacher, Los, Stehrer, Timmer, & de Vries, 2013), Eora
(Lenzen, Kanemoto, Moran, & Geschke, 2012), the ICIO (OECD, 2015) and the GTAP database (with interp-
olation provided as part of work in the Global Carbon Project (Peters, Davis, et al., 2012)). We use EXIOBASE
because of the ability for us to update accounts, its regional, sectoral and product detail and its suitability for
calculation of impacts for the EU: EXIOBASE consists of a MRIO constructed for 44 countries (28 EU and 16
non-EU, including all major EU trading partners) and ﬁve Rest of the World regions (RoW), disaggregated into
200 products and 163 industries. A full analysis of diﬀerences between MRIO databases has been the subject
of other work and is thus not covered here (Inomata & Owen, 2014; Tukker & Dietzenbacher, 2013; Wood,
Moran, Rodrigues, & Stadler, 2019).
The EXIOBASE3 dataset is publicly available for 1995–2011 (Stadler et al., 2018), but was constructed
using a reproducible process to update to more recent years as data has become available (nowcasting
procedure as described in (Stadler et al., 2016)). As such, with the availability of macro-economic data,
trade data and estimates for product output, the database has been updated to 2016, the latest year
that macro-economic data was available at the time of writing. Fuel combustion data was available for
estimation of GHG emissions up to 2015, with additional national level data for CO2 available for 2016
(BP, 2017). Other GHGs were estimated based on the nowcasting procedure in Stadler et al. (2016) and
rescaled at the sectoral level using PRIMAP (Gütschow et al., 2016) to 2015, with 2016 being estimated
based on trends in economic output and eﬃciency. Emissions for CO2, CH4, N2O, SF6, HFCs and PFCs
were included. All sources of emissions are included (following the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) categorization), including from agricultural production, but excluding those from the
speciﬁc category of ‘land use, land use change and forestry’, which are diﬃcult to attribute to production
sectors within a certain year.
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3. Results
3.1. EU GHG footprints and production accounts
EU GHG emissions have been decreasing since around the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–8, for both PBCA and
CBCA (Figure 1). The peak value of the production account was around 2003. For the consumption account,
the peaking was delayed, until 2007 (due to the carbon intensity of international trade – see Wood, Grubb,
et al. (2019)), with a consistent decline since the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis, apart from a very short recovery
in growth (previously picked up in 2009 by Peters, Marland, et al. (2012)). The production account was 4.9 Gt
in 2010, dropping to 4.4 Gt in 2015; the consumption account was 29% higher than the production account
in 2010 (6.3 Gt) and 27% higher in 2015 (5.6 Gt). Emissions have decreased 13% for the production account
since 1995, whilst the CBCA has decreased 8%. However, since the peaking of emissions in the mid-2000s,
using 2007 as a basis, the production account has decreased 14%, whilst the consumption account has
reduced 19%.
Non-CO2 gases are a signiﬁcant contributor to the gap between production and consumption accounts (see
Table 1; full results for CO2-only and on a per-capita basis are available in the supporting information). The
results show that net-trade accounts for 40% of our total non-CO2 footprint, whereas for CO2, net-trade is
15% of the footprint. The results point to the importance of trade in food/agriculture (CH4 and N20), and
mining (CH4), which we return to later.
3.2. Emission intensity and rate of decoupling
Whilst the most recent data (since 2014) implies a potential return to emissions growth, it is perhaps too early
to make any conclusions on the start of a new trend. We can investigate the level of reductions relative to
economic growth through the rate of decoupling – how much reduction (or increase) in emissions is occur-
ring for every unit change in GDP. Given potential stable economic growth in the order of 2% p.a. the
Figure 1. (a) Production and consumption accounts of GHG Emissions for the EU28. (b) Relative change in production and consumption accounts
compared to 1995.
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question arises whether we can decouple fast enough (noting in order to stay in line with a 1.5°C carbon
budget, much larger reductions will be needed in the future). In Figure 2, the measure of emissions intensity
of the economy is plotted alongside the decoupling factor – the rate of change in emissions intensities from
one year to the next. Whilst there has been a general decrease in the emissions intensity of the economy, the
decrease is shown by the decoupling factors to be in the order of 2%, so generally in the order of typically
assumed long-run per-capita economic growth, and not exceeding it. Maximum rates are up to 4–6%, with a
few isolated ‘negative’ decoupling years, which means that the emissions intensity of the economy actually
became worse in these years. Of note, these negative values often are post-recession years (ca 2001 ca 2008)
and precede a strong ‘return to growth’ period. We return to a deeper analysis of drivers underlying these
results later.
Figure 2. Production and consumption eﬃciency and decoupling (emission per unit GDP) rates and absolute trends for the EU28.
Table 1. CO2, Non-CO2 and GHG production and consumption accounts. Net GHG trade results are emissions embodied in imports net of
emissions embodied in exports.
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2016
CO2 only:
Production CO2 (Gt) 4.1 4.1 4.3 4.0 3.6 3.6
Consumption CO2 (Gt) 4.6 4.8 5.1 4.8 4.2 4.3
Net CO2 trade relative to consumption 11% 15% 17% 16% 15% 15%
Non-CO2 GHGs
Production non-CO2 (Gt) 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8
Consumption non-CO2 (Gt) 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.4
Net non-CO2 trade relative to consumption 31% 39% 46% 43% 39% 40%
All Greenhouse gases:
Production GHG (Gt CO2-eq) 5.1 5.0 5.2 4.9 4.4 4.4
Consumption GHG (Gt CO2-eq) 6.1 6.3 6.8 6.3 5.6 5.6
Net GHG trade relative to consumption 16% 21% 24% 23% 21% 21%
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3.3. Growth in emissions embodied in imports
The EU GHG footprint can be broken down into the part that is induced in other regions of the world, and that
which occurs domestically. Emissions in imports grew by 27% from 1.5 Gt in 1995 to 1.9 Gt in 2015, and emis-
sions in exports grew by 44% from 536 Mt to 772 Mt. Domestic emissions for domestic consumption hence
reduced from 5084 Mt to 4424 Mt (−13%). Thus for the EU, by 2015 a signiﬁcant portion of the emission
accounts have become associated with trade: emissions that occur overseas (33% of the EU consumption
account is due to emissions embodied in imports), and due to consumption overseas (17% of the EU production
account is emissions embodied in exports).
While historically, trade with Russia was the most important source for embodied GHG in imports (see sup-
porting information for full data), nowadays imports from Asia play a more signiﬁcant role (Figure 3 top). In 2015,
GHG emissions embodied in imports to the EU28 were higher than the emissions embodied in exports in total
(Figure 3 bottom), and also for trade with all world regions. In some of the previous years there was a slight trade
deﬁcit in regard to embodied GHG emissions with North America (1997–2006 and 2012, 2013) and Australia
(2012).
Of note, emissions in imports mostly grew to 2008, and have reduced since (we return to this
below). In contrast, emissions in exports have been less dynamic and generally increasing (Figure 3
bottom).
Figure 3. GHG emissions embodied in the EU trade. Top: Trade ﬂows of embodied GHG emission transfers of the EU with other world regions for
2015. ‘I’: GHG emissions embodied in EU imports originating in another region, ‘E’: emissions embodied in EU exports to other world regions.
Values depict GHG emissions in Mt CO2 eq. Bottom: Totally traded GHG emissions from 1995 to 2015.
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3.4. Drivers of EU GHG footprints
Overall, changes in GHG emissions can be broken down into a number of both domestic and foreign changes:
changes in how goods are produced (production technology); the types of goods and services traded or con-
sumed; and the level of trade and consumption. From 1995 to 2015 we can point to the changes being driven
mainly by two of these factors. First, the reduction in GHG intensity of production – both within the EU and in
other countries in the upstream supply chain of consumed products – was a major driver for decreased emis-
sions, especially in the early and mid-2000s (see table with annual changes in the supporting results). Running
counter to gains in GHG eﬃciency, increased total consumption per capita drove growth in GHG footprints up
until the ﬁnancial crisis. Other factors that played a role in the increase in GHG footprints, although not as sig-
niﬁcant, were the changes in the structure of intermediate inputs – that is, the changes in products demanded
by industries, regardless of where they are sourced from; the changes in the origin of these intermediate pro-
ducts; the composition and sourcing of ﬁnal products; consumption per capita; population growth; and changes
in direct emissions.
Figure 4 shows the cumulative drivers for changes in GHG footprints in the bars, and the total annual foot-
print change compared to 1995 GHG footprints. In the ﬁgure, negative bars indicate drivers for reductions in
GHG, while positive bars indicate drivers for increased emissions. The total change is the sum of positive and
negative drivers.
The emissions associated with changes in the sourcing of products – both intermediate and ﬁnal products –
increase until the ﬁnancial crisis, reﬂecting the increased specialization of European production and outsourcing
of intermediate production stages to other countries, especially to Asia. However, the contribution of these trade
related changes are quite minor, especially for intermediate production, so that the outsourcing of, for example,
steel production from Europe to China has, in the scheme of things, a relatively minor impact on emissions.
Instead the growth in total consumption (including direct imports of ﬁnished products), has a much larger
role in the increase of the GHG footprint.
3.5. Sector analysis
In order to target consumption-based policies, insights into sectors and product groups are required. Two
diﬀerent perspectives are possible: emissions organized according to which sectors are emitting the GHG
Figure 4. Drivers for cumulative changes in carbon footprints between 1995 and 2015. Solid line represents total cumulative (consumption-
based) GHG emissions change in each year referent to 1995.
CLIMATE POLICY 7
Figure 5. (a) GHG Emissions (exports, imports and net footprint) by source sector (2015). (b) GHG Emissions (exports, imports and net footprint)
by sector of ﬁnal good (2015).
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emissions; and emissions organized according to the product group that contains the embodied emissions in
consumption.
In Figure 5(a), we ﬁrstly disaggregate the EU production account (emissions occurring in the EU28) into
eight major sectoral activities. In the second column, emissions attributed to exported products and services
are subtracted, and then in the third column, emissions attributed to imported products and services are
added. The fourth column shows the resulting emission pattern linked to European consumption. As
expected, the production account consists of a large portion of emissions in electricity production, followed
by manufacturing (direct household emissions – which include personal motor vehicle driving, cooking and
heating with fuels in the home – are also signiﬁcant). In comparison, the largest share of exported emissions
is linked to manufactured products, followed by energy/utility products and transport services. As for
imported emissions, in addition to the manufacture of goods, mining and agricultural products play an impor-
tant role.
In Figure 5(b), PBCA and CBCA of emissions are instead diﬀerentiated by ﬁnal good. In this case, the emissions
linked to exported energy/utility and transport services are attributed to the ﬁnal good. These are much larger
for manufacturing products but also services and construction.
These results lend themselves to a set of conclusions (Figure 6): Almost half of the embodied carbon in
European consumption of manufacturing products is due to imports. However, as there are also large
exports of manufacturing products, the general perception of large scale European de-industrialisation at the
expense of imported goods does not hold true; instead, industrial specialization might play a bigger role in
the balance of emissions in imports and exports of manufactured goods. On a net-basis, only 25% of embodied
carbon from manufacturing is imported. As the majority of mining activities are located outside of EU28, 75% of
emissions from mining to serve European consumption are located outside of EU28. Similarly, for agricultural
products, overall EU28 exports are rather moderate compared to imports, resulting in a net import of 29% of
emissions to serve European consumption.
Figure 6 therefore lends itself to a diﬀerentiated perspective on the frequently voiced concerns about
European de-industrialisation. In terms of manufacturing emissions, Europe is net-importer, but ‘only’ at a
scale of 25%. The larger volume of net-imported emissions is linked to mining and agriculture. However,
Figure 6 is also testimony to the closely integrated nature of global supply chains. Thirty-seven percent of agri-
cultural, 45% of manufacturing and 79% of mining emissions caused by European consumption patterns occur
outside of the EU. From a European perspective, therefore, both CBCA and PBCA of emissions are important, and
require careful consideration from a policy perspective.
Figure 6. Production vs Consumption emissions by sector: internal and external attribution.
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Figure 7. Product level results showing embodied greenhouse gases in consumption, imports and exports of the EU. Size of square corresponds
to absolute quantity of the carbon footprint by product group, colour corresponds to the multiplier value (Carbon Footprint (CF) per unit of
consumption or trade). An interactive version is available at https://public.tableau.com/shared/P6S85B7YR.
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3.6. Detailed product results
Underpinning the sector results are quite a diverse range of products. Results in Figure 7 show the product level
results of EXIOBASE for consumption (products to ﬁnal demand of the EU28), imports and exports. The size of
the block shows the product level contribution to the carbon account, whilst the colour indicates the emissions
intensity of the product. A link is provided to an interactive version of the ﬁgure for further investigation. A
further breakdown of product level results by sector of origin of emissions is also included in the supporting
information.
Unsurprisingly, the ‘Electricity, gas and water’ product group is the largest contributor to the EU28 GHG foot-
print and has a relatively high GHG multiplier of 3 Gigagrams/million Euro (Gg/M€). (Note that, whilst EXIOBASE
has a disaggregation of electricity generation types and heat, the co-production of themmakes interpretation of
the aggregate product group more useful). Construction work is the second largest footprint category, with a
GHG multiplier of 0.3 Gg/M€, followed by health and social services (0.2 Gg/M€). Other notable items related
to construction are furniture and other manufactured goods (0.5 Gg/M€); and chemicals not elsewhere classiﬁed
(nec) with a multiplier of 0.9 Gg/M€. Transport items such as motor gasoline, vehicles and gas/diesel oil also
show up strongly.
When compared to the emissions embodied in imports, we see chemicals nec as the largest category, with
the multiplier of the imported chemicals (1 Gg/M€) slightly higher than the average consumption (0.9 Gg/M€).
Oil and gas extraction are the next largest, followed by a range of manufactured products (both highly manu-
factured such as motor vehicles, and basic iron and steel). Air and sea transport services, and somewhat later,
hospitality services (holidays), break up the list of manufactured products. For exports, it is motor vehicles that
embodies the most signiﬁcant GHG emissions, followed by a number of transport services, and other types of
machinery, equipment and other manufactured items. Of note is the reasonably high carbon intensity of the
major export groups.
Figure 7. Continued.
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4. Discussion
4.1. Future relevance of CBCA
Whilst attention is being placed on CBCA to help position additional policy options on reducing global GHG
emissions, there is no longer a strong evidence base that emissions under CBCA are growing, whilst PBCA of
emissions are declining. As such, there is no further divergence between production and consumption accounts
in comparison to that which occurred in the mid-2000s (Figure 1). Furthermore, whilst a signiﬁcant portion of the
CBCA of the EU28 is sourced from overseas (Figure 2), there is no evidence that the displacement of domestic
industry by foreign industry has had anywhere near as big an impact on emissions as increases in consumption
levels. Hence, the access to increased ‘cheap’ imports as well as domestically produced goods, rather than the
displacement of domestic industries, is responsible for the major growth in CBCA. That is, there is little evidence
that oﬀ-shoring has had a major impact on CBCA, especially for intermediate goods (Figure 4).
These conclusions, as well as the major impact of the ﬁnancial crisis (Figures 1–4), point to the strong relation-
ship between GDP growth and GHG emissions. Can the decline in emissions during the late 2000s and early
2010s be simply due to slow economic growth, that might not resume, or were there enough improvements
in emissions intensity? Karstensen et al. (2018) conclude that strong links between CO2 emissions and GDP
have driven the changes in emission levels over the years. Our results show no major changes in the decoupling
between GHG emissions and GDP at times of low emissions growth; in fact, the opposite is more clearly visible,
where recessions cause a disruption to the average 2–3% annual rate of decoupling (Figure 2). Since the
ﬁnancial crisis, emissions intensity (mainly of production, Figure 4) was the main driver of the larger than
average decoupling rate (Figure 2), but these improvements have not been seen in the last two years (Figure
4), resulting in reduced rates of decoupling for the EU (Figure 2). It remains to be seen if these trends continue
or not.
If the main drivers of changes in the CBCA are both overall aﬄuence (increasing factor) counteracted by
improvements on the production side (decreasing factor), the question arises about the potential future rel-
evance of CBCA. Firstly, the percentage of GHG embodied in imports for the EU is high, at 33% (SI data) and
is only likely to grow (Wood, Grubb, et al., 2019). Hence policy must consider governance issues related to
these emissions; quite simply domestic policies are not covering one third of the GHG footprint of EU consump-
tion (though they are covering signiﬁcant emissions that go into exports). Secondly, the use of CBCA may be
useful to motivate policy options for the decarbonization of international supply-chains (Wiebe, 2018), taking
advantage of the knowledge of trade relationships.
4.2. Relevance of sectoral results for policy
Comparison of the PBCA and CBCA of emissions for diﬀerent sectors (Figures 5 and 6) shows that, for household,
services and transport (the transport sector in MRIO tables conceptually covers both personal transport and
transport of goods, domestically and internationally, (Hu, Wood, Tukker, Boonman, & de Boer, 2019)), inter-
national trade of embodied emissions is limited, and PBCA and CBCA largely coincide. For these sectors,
energy and climate policies have been largely tailored to consumption choices (eﬃciency standards, ﬁnancial
support, advice), combined with attention to electricity generation. Pricing instruments, especially gasoline
taxes, have also been implemented as a consumption charge. For these products and sectors, there has
been a considerable focus on eﬃciency standards for the operations phase of products, for example for build-
ings, appliances and vehicles. However, in many cases, a substantial share of the whole life-cycle emissions of
these goods occurs during the production stage. To lower entire life-cycle emissions from consumption, these
embodied emissions must be considered (Scott, Roelich, Owen, & Barrett, 2018).
For mining, manufacturing and agriculture, products are intensively traded internationally, and PBCA and
CBCA of emissions diﬀer signiﬁcantly. In comparison to Karstensen et al. (2018) (who only look at CO2 for sectoral
results), the inclusion of other GHGs furtrher increases the importance of the mining and agricultural sectors in
both CBCA of emissions and emissions embodied in trade. The major energy and climate policy instruments (EU
ETS, EU common agricultural policy) have been largely focused on the production side (and focused on CO2),
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while consumption-based policies like the EU-Ecodesign and Eco-labelling Directive retain limited product cov-
erage and largely focus on emissions during operation and not embodied in the product. This is despite signiﬁ-
cant public support for climate policies that focus on resource eﬃciency (Cherry, Scott, Barrett, & Pidgeon, 2018).
With hindsight, energy and climate policies for manufacturing, mining and agriculture should also be con-
sidered for their eﬀects in the upstream and downstream supply chains, complementary to the production
side. With the international tradability of their products, concerns about competitiveness or carbon leakage
have resulted in a persistent watering down of stringency of production-based policies and the use of
special provisions like free allowance allocation or reductions from energy taxation, muting much of the
desired incentive eﬀect. The extent of such market distortion was recently highlighted by Shapiro (2019),
who ﬁnds several hundred billion dollars of global subsidies on CO2 due to protectionist measures of down-
stream industries.
4.3. Jurisdiction
The large share of industrial and agricultural emissions embodied in international trade points to the importance
of explicitly considering the diﬀerence between the statutory incidence and the economic incidence of policy
instruments. The statutory incidence refers to the actor liable to comply with a standard or pay a carbon tax,
whilst the economic incidence refers to which actors are exposed to the policy because of pass-through of
carbon costs or impacts on product markets.
Without international trade, making producers liable for carbon emissions is in most instances suﬃcient.
Upstream producers will pass carbon costs along the value chain, and thus all actors along the value chain
receive incentives for emission reductions (economic incidence).2
With international trade this picture changes. Statutory responsibility for carbon pricing in industry (in the EU,
New Zealand, Korea, California, Quebec, Ontario and Chinese provincial pilots) currently rests with emitters, e.g.
producers of materials. These producers will however only pass some of the carbon cost on to product prices
where products are traded and priced in global markets (Demailly & Quirion, 2008). Concerns that incremental
policy costs in one region could trigger relocation of production or investment to other regions (carbon leakage)
has resulted in carbon leakage protection measures like free allowance allocation, further muting the carbon
cost pass-through (Neuhoﬀ, Martinez, & Sato, 2006). As a result of the limited carbon cost pass-through, the
economic incidence of the policy instrument is largely constrained to the production stage, and mitigation
options along the value chain are not incentivised (Grubb et al., 2019).
As a response, border adjustments have been long proposed. Border adjustments aim to include carbon
costs also in the price of imported products and materials and could be highly relevant for a number of the
key sectors in our analysis (e.g. chemicals, oil and gas, transport and transport equipment, machinery). Under
border adjustments, carbon related production cost increases would be reimbursed for exports to avoid distor-
tions of international competition. A variety of detailed implementation options have been proposed. However,
in order to enhance political acceptance and reduce the risk of challenges at the World Trade Organisation
(WTO), all these options have provisions attached that increase their complexity and reduce their eﬀectiveness
with respect to environmental and carbon leakage protection (Cosbey, Droege, Fischer, & Munnings, 2019)
Some analysts argue for moving the (statutory) responsibility for carbon pricing from producers to consu-
mers. At the point of sale of a product to ﬁnal consumers, a charge corresponding to the carbon embodied
in the production of the product would be due (Bruyn, Nusselder, Rooijers, & Wijngaarden, 2018). Implemen-
tation would require that emissions are monitored, reported and veriﬁed along the (individual) value chain
(including emissions in plants and farms in third countries). However, the administrative eﬀort involved to
reliably monitor and report emissions, and to attribute these to individual products along the entire global
value chain, may be rather high, as will the public veriﬁcation of product speciﬁc emissions for all products (dis-
cussed in (Grubb et al., 2019)).
A combination of production and consumption-based pricing instruments has been proposed as an alterna-
tive (Neuhoﬀ et al., 2016). Producers would pay the carbon price for emissions exceeding a benchmark and
beneﬁt to the extent that they outperform the benchmark. Consumers would pay a carbon price for emissions
intensive products – including as part of products and buildings – at the benchmark level for speciﬁc materials.
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Such approaches could capture a signiﬁcant portion of the GHG footprint that escapes traditional measures
(Figure 5). The full carbon price can be reinstated along the entire value chain, while carbon leakage risks are
avoided and administrative complexity is minimized.
4.4. Robustness of the empirical basis for policy design
Whilst not the focus of this article, the robustness of CBCA has come under considerable scrutiny due to the
variability in results from diﬀerent modelling exercises and the subjective nature of some decisions when under-
taking MRIO modelling. Regarding the latter, MRIO approaches have a number of strengths and weaknesses for
CBCA that should be kept in mind when interpreting results. The strengths include a complete coverage of
goods and services in the economy, including (in the case of most developed countries) imputations of the
non-formal economy. Furthermore, with the investment in global MRIO models over the last 10 years (see
Tukker & Dietzenbacher, 2013), data are available for most countries individually, and for all regions of the
world in total. The availability of country level input-output tables allows for the explicit capture of trade and
onward processing through an economy, thus capturing the regionally delineated emissions intensity of pro-
duction as it contributes to intermediate processing before ﬁnal consumption. However, most MRIOs operate
at an aggregated product level, usually discerning somewhere between 30 and a few hundred product
groups. If goods within a product group have a very distinct emissions intensity to others in the same
product group, then aggregation errors can be introduced (Bouwmeester & Oosterhaven, 2013; de Koning
et al., 2015; Steen-Olsen, Owen, Hertwich, & Lenzen, 2014; Wood, Hawkins, Hertwich, & Tukker, 2014). The
choice of EXIOBASE for this paper is due to the enhanced resolution on emissions intensive processes (Wood
et al., 2014), but sector level results have not seen much veriﬁcation apart from at an aggregated resolution
by Owen, Wood, Barrett, and Evans (2016), Wieland, Giljum, Bruckner, Owen, and Wood (2018), and Rodrigues,
Moran, Wood, and Behrens (2018). A further weakness of CBCA in general (and particularly for MRIO) is that inter-
temporal concepts are diﬃcult to treat. Speciﬁcally, we mean investment in capital for production in later years
(included in the account of the year of investment (Södersten, Wood, & Hertwich, 2018a, 2018b), and emission
spikes, such as from land-use change (Pendrill et al., 2019) which are not included in this work).
To enhance the overall robustness of MRIO results, a number of studies have attempted to quantify uncer-
tainty, by parametrizing errors of either original source data (Karstensen, Peters, & Andrew, 2015; Lenzen, Wood,
& Wiedmann, 2010) or the actual MRIO data (Moran & Wood, 2014; Rodrigues et al., 2018), and running monte-
carlo simulations to estimate error distributions. From such work, it is clear that uncertainty of the CBCA of large
regions such as the EU is relatively low (in the order of a few percentage points), with most of the error either due
to the temperature metric chosen (Karstensen et al., 2015), or the GHG emission account itself (Moran & Wood,
2014). Exercises on database comparisons lead to similar results (Owen, 2017; Owen, Steen-Olsen, Barrett, Wied-
mann, & Lenzen, 2014).
5. Conclusions
CBCA of GHG emissions has the potential to help informmore eﬀective climate change policy aimed at reducing
global carbon emissions. However, the debate over the EU’s GHG footprint in aggregate is almost pointless
without an appreciation of its structure. This is because some emission sources are unavoidable, whereas
others may have strong policy implications: the purpose of this paper is to present a complete overview and
explain where and what matters in the debate (and why). We hence applied CBCA of emissions to the EU
over the period 1995–2016, focussing on levels and drivers of change, as well as on which sectors or product
groups policy could focus. We found that, ﬁrstly, the EU28 CBCA has declined over the period, reducing by
8%. This is in the direction of, but somewhat less of a reduction than the PBCA of emissions of the EU, which
reduced by 13%. Whilst around one-third of the EU28 GHG footprint occurs overseas, the gap between the
PBCA and CBCA (reﬂecting net-trade) has stabilized at just over 20% of the CBCA.
The high percentage of emissions on foreign soil has three implications. First, several (but not all) of the major
sources of net carbon embodied in imports are largely unavoidable consequences of European consumption
because the primary production activities (e.g. mining and some food production) could not realistically
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occur within the EU. These emissions therefore require policy responses at the consumption level. Second, emis-
sions embodied in trade for basic materials and industrial products is high. This can reduce the carbon cost pass-
through along the value chain and thus render purely production-based policies less eﬀective in incentivising
mitigation measures along the value chain. To ensure eﬀective incentives along the entire value chain, it is war-
ranted to (i) consider carbon border adjustments, (ii) a shift to targeted consumer policies, or (iii) combining pol-
icies to incentivise carbon eﬃciency of production with policies to incentivise eﬃcient material use and
substitution. Third, when looking at the regional diﬀerences in production (and not explicitly looking at the
role of transport), with few exceptions, the emissions of EU consumption would diﬀer little whether the products
are produced at home or abroad. Hence the debate is not primarily about the global impact of trade, but about
measures to enhance carbon eﬃciency of domestic production and consumption and to encourage and
support other regions in their eﬀorts towards the same objectives.
Notes
1. Eurostat does not currently use a multi-regional approach for CBCA because of the reliance on other regions’ statistics. They
use what is known as the ‘domestic technology assumption’ (see Andrew, Peters, & Lennox, 2009; Tukker, De Koning, Wood,
Moll, & Bouwmeester, 2013), which assumes that goods produced overseas are produced with the same technology as that of
Europe. Such approaches generally underestimate the emissions embodied in imports of developed countries. Work is
ongoing at Eurostat on new data to avoid this assumption.
2. Policy makers may still target policies directly to intermediary producers or ﬁnal consumers ﬁrst to allow for diﬀerentiation or
compensation of distributional impacts of pricing instruments, second, to address (organizational or) behavioural aspects with
for example product standards (Scott, Giesekam, Barrett, & Owen, 2019), building standards or to address strategic aspects
(innovation, infrastructure) of decisions (Grubb, 2014).
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Appendix
Extended methods: multi-regional input-output analysis and footprinting
Input-output analysis is an economic approach, constructed from observed data from a particular region, which considers inter-indus-
try ﬂows between economic sectors (Leontief, 1941; Miller & Blair, 2009). Environmental impacts can be calculated in this framework
by using an environmentally extended input-output table, attributing requirements and impacts to each of the industries or products.
However, the original national model does not account for technological and productivity diﬀerences among countries, which is of
contemporary signiﬁcance, as economies shift from local to global production chains. Multi-regional input-output (MRIO) analysis can
account for oﬀshore impacts and requirements, allowing the evaluation of a region’s social and environmental impact to be calculated
from its consumption, rather than its production. MRIO analysis has been described in detail elsewhere (see, for example, Miller & Blair,
2009 ), and thus, this section will provide only a brief summary of the background for the analysis.
A MRIO model, comprising n regions, relates total output from a region r, to the inter-industry demand and ﬁnal demand, and can
be expressed as:
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In the above equation, x is the vector for total output in each sector; A is the multi-regional coeﬃcient matrix, which shows the
relation between the output from each sector being used as input for production; y is the ﬁnal demand vector, representing all ﬁnal
consumption, such as households and government expenditures, capital, and stock variation. Imports are implicitly recorded either as
inputs into intermediate demand, or as purchases by ﬁnal users.
Given emissions of production as a row vector f showing the emissions occurring in each industry in each region of the world, as
well as those occurring in ﬁnal demand (e.g. cooking, heating) fhh. GHG impacts of consumption can be calculated via the input-
output model:
Q = s (I− A)−1y + fhh (2)
Where Q represents the GHG (or CO2) footprint of consumption taking place in the EU (due to consumption of the EU: y), and s is a
vector containing direct GHG (or CO2) emission coeﬃcients for each industry (s = f xˆ−1). Emissions by source region/industry are
simply a diagonalization of the emissions intensity vector (where emissions occur):
qind = sˆ (I− A)−1y (3)
Emissions by ﬁnal product consumed are simply a diagonalization of the ﬁnal demand vector:
qprod = s(I− A)−1ŷ (4)
All results are a simple aggregation of the most detailed product/country combinations, following the aggregation keys as pro-
vided in the supporting information.
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Results are also presented for the rate of decoupling Dt for year t. Production and consumption accounts are ﬁrstly normalised by GDP
in 2011 international dollars:
Dt = 1−
Qt
GDPt
Qt−1
GDPt−1
See Gupta (2015) for further discussion around decoupling metrics.
Furthermore, we decompose the changes in GHG footprints over time as the sum of the changes in the diﬀerent components of
Equation. 1:
Dq = qt+1 − qt = Ds+ D(I− A)−1 + Dy+ Dfhh
We further decompose A into two components, following the method introduced by (Xu & Dietzenbacher, 2014): changes in inputs
required for production, regardless of where they come from (H), and sourcing of these intermediate inputs (T). Likewise, we decom-
pose changes in ﬁnal demand y into changes in the composition of ﬁnal products consumed, regardless of their origin or volume (c),
the sourcing of these ﬁnal goods (yt ), total consumption per capita (ycap), and population (p). We can then re-write Equation 1 as:
q = s(I− H⊗ T)−1cytycapp+ fhh
For each pair of years, the tables for year t + 1 were deﬂated to previous year prices following product-speciﬁc deﬂators for each
country and year, without new balancing of the input-output tables. We applied the structural decomposition method of the average
of the polar decompositions (Dietzenbacher & Los, 1998).
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